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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The Tactical Action Officer (TAO) is tasked with directing the tactical
employment of his ship during the period of his watch [Ref. 1: p. 4-16]. Even though
the watchstation of TAO was created primarily to provide quick reaction defense of
Naval vessels during periods of hostilities [Ref. 2: p. 56], the TAO's charge can cover
the entire spectrum of tasks his ship may be directed to perform from independent
steaming in peacetime to combat operations in a battle group [Ref. 1: p. 4-16].
It is known among naval circles that in directing tactical operations, the TAO
must assess a plethora of information and make a multitude of decisions in directing
the efforts of his ship to detect, classify, localize, track, and destroy the enemy. The
body of knowledge he must consider includes already received and newly incoming
facts and estimates dealing with the acoustic environment, weapons, procedures, orders
of battle, rules of engagement, the political situation, and other factors which may
affect his decisions. In war, the speed and accuracy with which he can assess
information, reach decisions, and act upon them could mean the difference between
victory or defeat.
The nature of modern warfare often requires information to be evaluated and
correct decisions to be made in fractions of seconds. The short amount of time
available to access and correctly assess information and the frequent absence of
important information are often cited as reasons for incorrect tactical actions.
Decision aids for the TAO can be divided into 3 groups: 1) those that provide
planning support or baseline information which is used before an operation such as
naval warfare publications, intelligence reports, and instructions from higher authority;
2) those that assist in the detection and identification of contacts once an operation
commences such as sensors and signal processors; and 3) those that help evaluate
information and decide how best to continue an operation such as displays, Combat
Information Center (C1C) procedures, and quick reaction computer systems. This
author knows of no operational decision aid that combines all these groups into one
entity that can provide real-time tactically viable assistance to the TAO.
B. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems such as expert systems and neural
networks could be instrumental in providing multi-level, real-time decision support
assistance to the TAO. AI is a branch of computer science that consists of hardware
and software that exhibit intelligent behavior. These systems can assist in the solving of
ill-structured problems or even solve problems by themselves. [Ref. 3: p. 40]
Initial thoughts on the milieu encountered by the TAO indicate three areas where
artificial intelligence could assist: data storage and rapid retrieval, data analysis and
decision support. Rapid data retrieval is the ability to quickly access information from
some data base. The author defines data analysis as the examination of information to
aid tactical decision makers in reaching an assumption about enemy actions or
intentions. Decision support is the use of computer-based technology to aid command
authorities in decision making in semistructured or unstructured decision tasks
[Ref. 4: p. 1]. .Expert systems appear to have merit in recommending tactical actions to
the TAO [Ref. 5: p. 13] and neural networks show promise in dealing with incomplete
or fuzzy data [Ref. 6: p. 25]. A real-time decision support aid to the TAO using these
new technologies should be pursued.
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
This thesis will attempt to answer the following questions:
1. Can the execution of TAO responsibilities be improved with the assistance of
Artificial Intelligence based systems, in particular, neural networks?
2. Is the current state of the art in neural network development sufficient to allow
their near-term use in the tactical environment by a TAO?
The first phase of research will define the Tactical Action Officer concept and
discuss some problem areas inherent with it. In the course of this section, a possible
ASW scenario will be presented to illustrate the TAO's milieu. The next steps in the
process will address expert systems and neural networks, covering what they are, give
basic descriptions of their characteristics and an understanding of how they work.
Synopses of their capabilities and limitations will also be discussed. The final portion
of the paper will propose a structure for a Comprehensive TAO- Assistance System
(CTAS) which would employ the AI technologies discussed.
II. THE TAO CONCEPT
A. BACKGROUND
1. Definition
OPNAV Instruction 3120.32, the Standard Organization and Regulations
Manual for Naval ships states that [Ref. 1: p. 4-16],
The Tactical Action Officer is the representative of the Commanding Officer
(CO) concerning the tactical employment and the defense of the unit. . . . The
TAO is responsible for the safe and effective operation of the combat systems
and for any other duties prescribed by the Commanding Officer.
The TAO has the authority to fight the ship using ship's weapons or other assets under
ship's control when the tactical situation demands. He has the responsibility to defend
his vessel and is accountable directly to the ship's Commanding Officer for his actions
and decisions. [Ref. 5: pp. 15-16]
2. Need for TAOs
Current Soviet maritime warfare strategy and naval tactics call for mass
coordinated missile attacks on the enemy naval force from air, surface and sub-surface
platforms in a sophisticated EW environment [Ref. 2: p. 56]. Because reaction time to
missile attack is measured in seconds, it is neither expected nor possible for the
Commanding Officer to be in the ship's Combat Information Center (CIC) during
every moment in which the ship faces possible danger. Accordingly, the position of
TAO was created to defend the ship until the CO arrived in CIC and then assist him
when he assumed the duties of fighting the ship [Ref. 2: p. 57]. Since the watch station
was formally established by the Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970's [Ref. 2: p. 57],
it is generally accepted that the responsibilities of the TAO have increased from merely
defending the ship until the captain arrives, to actually handling the bulk of the tactical
decision making with the CO directing his actions via the maxim "control by negation".
In May 1972, the CO of the USS STERETT (DLG 31) included in the report
of his ship's engagement in Dong Hai Gulf the statement, "The Commanding Officer
who tries to run a 'one man' show will lose his ship." [Ref. 2: p. 56]. It can be
concluded that there is an acknowledged reliance on the abilities and role of the TAO.
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3. TAO Qualifications
On most destroyer or frigate sized ships the TAO is a 'warfare qualified'
Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander with at least four years of fleet experience
[Ref. 2: p. 57]. His basic knowledge should normally include the following [Ref. 5: pp.
15-16]:
* A background of knowledge and experience in Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-
submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), Amphibious
Warfare (AMW), and Electronic Warfare (EW), including a detailed knowledge
of his own ship's weapons and propulsion capabilities and limitations.
* A good knowledge of the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of fighter,
attack, ASW, EW and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, their associated
weapons systems and their means of employment.
* Familiarity with AAW, ASW, and EW sensors employed by his own ship and
other umts operating in the area.
* A familiarity with available intelligence on pertinent, potential enemy tactics
and doctrines and substantial knowledge about the capabilities and limitations
of enemy hardware resources; including platforms as weil as Anti-Ship Cruise
Missiles (ASCMs).
* Knowledge of the procedures utilized for Air Intercept Control (AIC) and for
Combat Air Patrol (CAP)/missile coordination.
B. PROBLEM AREAS
1. Domain Complexity
The range of stimuli to which the TAO must respond in identifying and
assessing the threat to his ship is so large that it is very unlikely he would be able to
consider all possibilities [Ref. 5: p. 12] without some means of paring the list. His
range of responses to counter the threat, which is governed by rules of engagement
[Ref. 7: p. 12], can vary from avoiding action to engaging and destroying the enemy.
In choosing his course of action, the TAO must consider many facets including his
own as weil as enemy capabilities. In that process he must estimate a probability of
success either explicitly or implicitly when selecting among his developed alternatives.
The basic knowledge with which the TAO must be familiar (shown in subsection 3
above) gives an idea of the complex arena in which he must function.
2. Temporal Pressure
It is generally known in military circles that the speed and sophistication of
weapon systems have increased dramatically in the years since World War II. Where
submarines of the 1940's had maximum speeds of less than 20 knots and fired
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torpedoes from a few hundred yards away, modern nuclear subs have maximum speeds
well in excess of 25 knots and can launch sea-skimming missiles from far beyond the
visual horizon. Persons familiar with the passive ASW problem would agree that
although the early phases of a prosecution can usually be measured in minutes or even
hours, split second decision making is often required to ensure a successful mission.
This is especially true in defending against ASCMs launched from a submarine at close
range.
It is logical to assume that the time it takes to place own-ship systems in
operation plays a part in the time available for the TAO to react to a given situation.
For many reasons it may be neither possible nor desireable to keep systems energized
and fully ready at all times while at sea. Even if the weapon launcher is energized and
loaded, firing parameters may have to be entered and weapon time of travel to the
target must also be factored-in which further compacts the time available for the TAO
to reach a decision on how best to defend his ship.
3. Information Overload and Accuracy
Table 1 lists but a sample of topics which can enter into the Tactical Action
Officer's decisions. The heading Outside World shows external factors over which the
TAO has very little if any control. They essentially create a cause and effect
relationship to which the TAO can only react. - Ship Environment shows several items in
which the TAO may have control over some aspects. This represents his immediate
surroundings. Kernel Factors lists constraints from higher authority. These are given
values which govern the realm of operation within which all actions must be contained.

























































* Rules of Engagement
* OTC Policy
* Command Policy
Environmental factors can change at any time and may indeed change many
times during the course of an operation [Ref. 5: pp. 28-29]. All of the information
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accessable to the TAO must be carefully sorted to determine relevance and then
applied to decisions concerning its accuracy and potential effect on the overall tactical
situation within the time available.
A review of the curriculum taught to TAOs in courses ashore drives home the
fact that a vast amount of knowledge must be learned. The timely recollection and
consideration of relevant information is what makes the job of the TAO truly difficult
[Ref. 7: p. 121. Even though much of the required knowledge is available to the TAO
in written form onboard ship, there is seldom sufficient time to locate a publication and
read pertinent passages. Consequently, the TAO must reiy on his ability to memorize
and recall data which brings forth the question of "how accurate is his memory?".
4. TAO Training
a. Initial Training
'Growing' a Tactical Action Officer is a process that takes several years.
The training of a TAO commences when an officer begins the steps to be designated
'warfare qualified'. For surface warfare officers this entails attending the Surface
Warfare Officer's School Basic Course (SWOS Basic) upon entry into the community
as a junior officer. There, the officer receives introductory level information on
seamanship, warfare areas, and combat operations. The course of instruction includes
more than 200 classroom hours in combat systems and tactics. [Ref. 8: p. 25]
Upon completing SWOS Basic the officer has an initial sea tour of from 2-3
years in which he applies and thus reinforces the subject matter learned in school
[Ref. 8: p. 25]. The author believes ship type and employment play key roles in an
officer's development to become a TAO. Hands-on training and actual observation
can be important in learning the complex weapon systems of today. Because certain
systems are only on certain ships and are employed only at specific times, some young
officers may never get the hands-on weapons familiarity the initial sea tour should
provide. Although lack of personal exposure is an impediment which can be overcome,
it could put an officer at a disadvantage against his peers who have had the
opportunity to observe systems firsthand shortly after learning about them in school.
The writer also feeis the employment of the ship plays a factor in the
tactical development oC a junior officer. A ship that is in long term overhaul tends to
be more concerned with equipment repair and replacement than training in tactical
systems and doctrine. Whereas a ship that deploys to the 'hot spots' of the world such
as the Eastern Mediterranean or Persian Gulf, will be at increased conditions of
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readiness that are more than just drill. In a ship so deployed, weapons and sensors are
more apt to be operated in combat ready modes with all officers exercising their
tactical thought processes. Comprehensive shipboard training programs and
attendance at TAO school may ease this uneveness in exposure caused by ship
employment but there is still no substitute for experience.
Usually before a surface warfare officer commences his first department
head tour, he has the opportunity to attend TAO School either in the Surface Warfare
Officer's Schooi Department Head Course or at one of the Fleet Combat Training
Centers [Ref. 8: p. 25]. TAO Schooi consists of 6 weeks of instruction covering the
following major areas (Ref. S: p. 26]:
1) Administration, Orientation and Testing
2) Threat Detection, Display and Reporting
3) Threat Identification and Assessment
4) Threat Destruction/ Neutralization
Trainers and mock-ups augment classroom time to enhance the learning process.
[Ref. 8: p. 26]
b. Follow-on Training
It has been the author's experience that follow-on training is sporadic and
essentially left up to the efforts of the officer and vicissitudes of ship schedules. Tactical
training after TAO school usually comes via the following methods: 1) Tactical
discussions with other officers, 2). Static wargames known as 'tacsits', 3) Computerized
simulations and wargames (i.e. NAVTAG), 4) Shore-based trainers, 5) Pier-side
trainers, 6) Fleet exercises, and 7) Professional readings and briefings. The frequency
with which any of these occurs is a function of ship scheduling, the availability of
training funds and the emphasis an officer and his command place on warfare
proficiency.
5. Personnel Turnover
Routine transfers are also a fact of life in the Navy. Unfortunately, these
transfers result in loss of ship-specific knowledge and require retraining of each new
TAO in the systems and peculiarities of each ship. [Ref. 5: p. 14]
C. TYPICAL ASW SCENARIO
The following passage illustrates the complex environment in which TAOs must
function [Ref. 5: pp. 18-19].
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During a period of increasing tensions, a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) has been
ordered from the continental US to reinforce the CVBG already on station in the
Mediterranean (Med). The dispatching of the second battle group has been termed a
provocative act by the adversary government which further stated the "peace loving
people of the world will resist this blatant imperialist move". The National Command
Authority has reiterated to all Commanding Officers their right to self defense yet
cautioned them to exercise restraint.
A ship already on duty in the Med has been ordered to conduct passive ASW
barrier operations in the waters west of Portugal in support of the CVBG passage
through the strait of Gibraltar. The battle group reaches the vicinity of the ship on
patrol during a period of poor visibility and severe weather including high winds and
heavy seas. The ship having been on station for several days with no enemy submarine
detection receives intelligence information of an anti-ship missile firing enemy
submarine near the patroi area. The submarine reported is nuclear powered and is
believed to be of the type that can fire its missiles while submerged. The ship's sonar
capabilities have been significantly degraded due to the high ambient noise from the
heavy weather and normally poor sonic conditions of the operating area. Additionally,
commercial shipping in the vicinity is also adding to the ambient noise level. The ship's
crew is fatigued and efficiency is further degraded from motion sickness as a result of
the extended patrol and severe weather.
The TAO is informed by a maritime patrol aircraft operating in support that a
contact is held on its sonobuoy pattern which is generating noises corresponding to the
type of submarine for which they are searching. The reported position puts the
submarine just within its maximum missile firing range to the CVBG but well within its
optimum attack prosecution range to the TAO's ship. No other ship or aircraft sensors
corroborate contact. The TAO assesses that it would be highly unlikely for the
submarine to have targeting quality information on the CVBG but quite possible that
his ship may be targeted. He must make some decisions and make them quickly. What
should he do?
This scenario is indicative of the demands placed on the TAO to quickly and
accurately perceive and respond to numerous diverse and often contradictory stimuli in
evaluating options and formulating decisions. The passage exemplifies the factors that




A. WHY CONSIDER EXPERT SYSTEMS?
Even though there is no substitute for the experience and training of the TAO,
expert systems appear to hold promise in solving some of the problems mentioned in
Chapter II. For example, the knowledge base of an expert system could store the
baseline data and other considerations which may impact the TAO's thought processes
[Ref. 9: p. 3], This would mean less reliance on the TAO's memory and facilitate
logical consideration of the consequences of alternatives selected via asking relevant
questions in a logical order [Refs. 9.5: pp. 3,22]. Logic would indicate that an expert
system would be helpful with the temporal pressure and information overload problem
because a computer can process data and other decision elements at very high speed
[Ref. 5: p. 12]. Proper programming would enable all pertinent factors to actually
impact the decision process vice only considering those which the TAO happens to
remember. Electronic data storage and retrieval could also assist in the verification of
sensor data. Known parameters could be stored in memory and rapidly compared with
received signals from ship sensors to aid in identification [Ref. 5: pp. 12-13]. The
problem of personnel turnover would be lessened because the expert system would
contain all required knowledge and ship-specific information thus easing- the transfer of
knowledge from one TAO to another. Even though training the TAO is still required,
his ability to remain current would be facilitated through use of the expert system as a
training tool. One more factor to consider is that computers do not get tired as people
do. This eliminates fatigue as an inhibitor to proper TAO decision making.
B. DEFINITION OF EXPERT SYSTEMS
Professor Edward Feigenbaum of Stanford University, one of the pioneers in
expert systems, defines an expert system as [Rqi. 10: p. 1]:
... an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge and inference
procedures to solve problems that are difficult enough to require significant
human expertise for their solution.
Because real-world tactical problems are complex, expert systems use heuristics to
focus the domain to be searched [Ref. 5: p. 22]. Fiegenbaum and Feldman [Ref. 11: p.
6] define a heuristic as:
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... a rule of thumb, strategy, trick, simplification, or any other kind of device
which drastically limits search for solutions in large problem spaces. . . . the
payoff in using heuristics is greatly reduced search and, therefore, practicality.
The basic components of an expert system are a knowledge base and an inference
engine. The knowledge base consists of facts, rules, and heuristics which embody the
expert's knowledge while the inference engine consists of the strategies and controls
which manipulate the knowledge base to determine a solution to a given problem
[Ref. 12: p. 34].
Conventional programs differ from expert systems in that sequential computer
programs use algorithms as their means for solving problems and expert systems use
heuristics to search a knowledge base. Also, expert systems have a clear separation of
data from the inference engine as opposed the adjacent storage of data and instructions
in conventional programs. .[Ref. 12: pp. 7-8]
In very basic terms, an expert system is a repository of knowledge of a specific
domain and procedures for putting that knowledge to use [Ref. 5: p. 25].
For a more in-depth understanding oi expert systems, the reader is invited to
review any of the references on expert systems currently available such as: Expert
Systems'. Artificial Intelligence in Business by Paul Harmon and David King, Expert
System Technology: Development 'and Application by Robert Keller or Expert Systems: A
Non- Programmer's Guide to Development and Applications by Paul Siegel.
C. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
Expert systems are good for applying a fixed set of logical rules dealing with
related facts in a specific domain [Ref. 6: p. 25]. Such stipulations are applicable to
many TAO functions but not necessarily to all. Particularly, expert systems fail when
input data is incomplete or fuzzy [Ref. 13: p. 4]. Even so. Zivovic and Gostlow
demonstrated the practical utility of expert systems in tactical applications with their
separate prototypes to assist the TAO. However, both concluded that a major
limitation of their systems was the fact that they could not respond in real-time
[Refs. 5,7: pp. 51.46]. These limitations would imply that current prototypes are useful
for training purposes but not actual tactical use. The author believes neural networks
may hold the key to overcoming these limitations.
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IV. NEURAL NETWORKS
A. WHAT ARE THEY?
Neural networks (also known as neural nets or parallel distributed processing) are
essentially differential equations that emulate the structure and function of the brain at
the neuron level. They describe the behavior of neurons and the interconnections
among them. [Ref. 13: p. 4] Neurons can be thought of as very simple processors. In
a rudimentary sense, the brain is a mass of tiny processors which are interconnected in
a very densely parallel manner. These processors communicate among themselves
through the transmission of electrical signals which either excite or inhibit connected
processors that receive the signals. The 'state of activation' among a set of neurons is
how information is represented and processed. [Ref. 6: p. 26]
Although both neural networks and expert systems are intelligent computer
systems, there are significant differences between them. A primary difference is the
level at which each perceives and understands data. Expert systems identify and
execute higher-level processes and relationships whereas neural nets mimic biological
processes and functions at the lowest levels of cognition. [Ref. 6: p. 25] For example,
an expert system (ES) may contain the rule "If signal frequency is 50hz then the sound
source is probably a propeller". Neural networks might represent individual words or
letters in the above rule or perhaps even the intrinsic characteristics of the sonar signal
itself. Representing information in this manner can require large numbers of neuron
activations to denote a particular element or idea.
B. NEURAL NETWORK COMPONENTS
Eight structures or concepts are important in understanding how neural networks
function. They are [Ref. 14: p. 46]:
• Processing Units
a State of Activation
• Output Function







Processing units (also called neurons, nodes or units) [Ref. 15: p. 2] are
relatively simple entities, each doing a simple job [Ref. 14: p. 47]. Each node accepts
multiple inputs and generates a single output [Ref. 15: p. 2] which in turn is transmitted
to other nodes as inputs. The output of each unit is determined by a differential
equation which describes how the signal evolves over time [Ref. 15: p. 2]. The set of
neurons that are 'turned on' and the degree to which each neuron is turned on is how
macro processing functions are accomplished. The activated set of nodes represents
particular conceptual objects or abstract meanings over which meaningful patterns can
be described. [Ref. 14: pp. 46-47]
2. State of Activation
According to David Rumelhardt, the state of activation is the "pattern of
activation over the set of processing units". In conventional computers, information is
represented by the number and sequence of ones and zeros, whereas in neural nets it is
the pattern of processor activation that captures what the system is trying to represent.
Although' node values may be binary as in conventional digital processors, the
activation values may be continuous or discrete over some range of values depending
on what the system is intended to model. For example, node output values may be ail
real numbers between -1 and +1 or perhaps discrete values within some set of
numbers such as" {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}. [Ref. 14: p. 48]
3. Output Function
The output function determines the strength or value of the signal a processing
unit sends to its neighbors. It is the means by which processing units interact. It can
be described by a differential equation that uses the input signal received to determine
the degree to which a node is energized. [Ref. 14: p. 48]
4. Pattern of Connectivity
The pattern of connectivity is the configuration in which units are physically or
logically interconnected. It is this configuration that constitutes what the system knows
and how it will respond to any specific input. [Ref. 14: p. 49]
5. Rule of Propagation
The rule of propagation takes the output values of 'upstream' nodes and
combines them to produce a net input for each particular unit [Ref. 14: p. 51].
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6. Activation Rule
The activation rule controls the affect incoming signals will have on the unit by
taking into account the current state of system activation. It uses the existing state of
the system and output from upstream nodes as input values in producing a new node
output. [Ref. 14: p. 51] The value resulting from this process is what the node's output
function actually receives for its input.
7. Learning Rule
The learning rule is how a neural net can change its own processing or
knowledge structure by itself. It gives the network the ability to develop new
connections among nodes and eliminate or modify the strengths of existing
connections. Thus, the system has the ability to learn autonomously. [Ref. 14: p. 52]
8. Environment
The environment in which the system must operate must be represented in a
form understandable to the network. Usually this is done as a time-varying stochastic
function over the range of possible input patterns [Ref. 14: p. 53]. The specifics of how
this is done is not germane to this level of discussion.6'
C. HOW THEY WORK
A neural net system is logically divided into 3 parts:- input, hidden, and output
nodes. Input nodes receive stimuli from sources external to the system. Hidden nodes
only receive inputs from and transmit to other nodes. They are not "visible" outside the
system and may be present in several layers* As the name would suggest, output nodes
send their signals out of the neural network system. [Ref. 14: p. 48]
Each neuron, except input neurons, receives input signals from many other
neurons. In addition to the different output values of each node, each connection
between them (sometimes called a synapse) has a value, called a weight, which is either
added to or multiplied with the output signal prior to being received by the connected
node. If the incoming sisnal exceeds the threshold level which is determined bv the
node's output function, the neuron "fires", meaning it sends its output signal to its
neighbors. [Ref. 6: p. 26]
The weights of the connections between some neurons are permanently set while
others fluctuate with net activity. The manner of the interconnections determines how
the net functions. [Ref. 6: p. 26]
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Because information is represented distributively over the set of processors, the
net's performance is not dependent on any single neuron. Therefore, if one neuron
fails, the pattern may still be completed. Research has shown that neural nets continue
to function with little or no degradation with up to 15% of the neurons inoperable
[Ref. 6: pp. 24,26].
The following example is excerpted from the article "Computing With Neural
Networks" found in the May 1987 issue of High Technology:
. . . suppose that the letter A is represented by a 10-bit binary code of Is and Os.
In a network, 10 input neurons might receive this data (one neuron per bit) and
relay it over weighted connections to neurons in the next layer. Each neuron in
this layer might be connected to four input neurons and be designed to fire a
pulse if the sum of the signals it receives is 1 or more. Here the synaptic weights
come into play. If all the weights between the input and second layer of neurons
were 1, for exampie, a second-layer neuron would need only one of its four input
neurons to have a bit with the value of 1. On the other hand, if the weights were
all 0.5, then the second-layer input would not fire uniess at least two of its input
neurons were Is.
Output signals from the second layer are passed over weighted synapses to a
third layer, where the process of neuron activation and inhibition occurs yet
again. This sequence can be repeated through a number of layers until the signals
reach an output layer. The pattern of active and inactive neurons in this last
layer is equated to the response: "This is the letter A-. " A different string of 10
input bits wouid propagate through the network across a different pattern of
connections, and would result in its own characteristic output pattern.
D. CAPABILITIES OF NEURAL NETWORKS
It is believed that neural network technology could have significant impact in the
areas of sensor processing, knowledge processing, and machine; robotic control
[Ref. 15: p. 3]. All of these uses have potential tactical applications to several aspects
of the TAO's functions. Some specifics of neural net capabilities are summarized in the
following paragraphs.
One of the most promising near term tactical uses for neural networks involves
their ability to recognize patterns. This has direct applications in the area of sonar and
radar signal processing in that programmed sonic, electromagnetic or electro-optical
patterns could be quickly gleaned from a mass of background noise. This pattern
recognition quality also gives neural nets the ability to 'discover' salient features among
stored data and to extract knowledge from seemingly unrelated and large amounts of
data. [Refs. 6,13: pp. 25, 4]
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Associative recall is the ability obtain the correct inputs from a degraded version
of input data [Ref. 6: p. 25]. With this ability, nets can deal with inexactitudes,
contradictions, errors and missing bits of information [Ref. 13: p. 4]. Such a
characteristic would be useful in an expert system which may not have all required
items of information or a sensor that is experiencing jamming or environmental
interference.
Neural nets have the ability to implement an instantaneous nearest neighbor
classification function for extremely large sets of example patterns, whether spatial or
spatiotemporal [Ref. 15: p. 3]. A tactical application using this characteristic could
provide immediate identification or classification of received acoustic, electromagnetic
or electro-optical signals.
The fact that neural nets can modify stored information in response to new
inputs means the system can learn [Ref. 6: p. 24]. The greater the number of
repetitions the stronger the learned response [Ref. 13: p. 4]. This trait might give a
signal processor the ability to more easily maintain track on a passive signal or re-
detect a signal that had been held over a period of time but was lost due to ambient
noise or use of countermeasures.
Parallel distributed processing has the ability to recall memories even if some
neurons fail. The fact that information is distributed among many processors means
that there is gradual degradation with damage as opposed to catastrophic failure in
conventional computers. Neural networks can still function with 10 to 15% of their
neurons destroyed. [Ref. 6: p. 24] Such a trait is an obvious benefit in terms of the
computer's maintainability and capability to sustain battle damage.
Neural networks have demonstrated the ability to recognize continuous speech
[Ref. 16]. This would possibly reap dividends by giving operators the ability to issue
verbal commands to the weapon systems they control.
Neural networks, when used to augment conventional computers, appear to have
promise in solving problems which were previously considered impossible. A decision
assistance system combining neural network and expert system technologies could
greatly assist the TAO in the performance of his duties. .
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V. COMPREHENSIVE TAO ASSISTANCE SYSTEM (CTAS): A
PROPOSAL
Thus far we have addressed the need for the Tactical Action Officer concept and
discussed some of the problems with its implementation. We then briefly covered what
expert systems and neural networks are along with some of their capabilities and
limitations.
Can Expert System Help Train Tactical Action Officers: Some Experiences From
an Early Prototype by Streten Zivovic and A TAO Expert System Prototype by Gareth
A. Gostlow created and presented expert system prototypes for use by Tactical Action
Officers. Yet, these prototypes had several shortcomings which rendered them
ineffective for shipboard tactical use. If the capabilities of neural nets, addressed in
Chapter IV of this paper, can actually be applied, then it seems logical to pursue
research into building a Tactical Action Officer assistance system which would
incorporate these AI technologies into a single tactically useful system. This chapter
will present a logical model for such a computerized decision aiding system, which the
author calls a Comprehensive Tactical Action Officer Assistance System (CTAS), that
may help solve some of the problems in fully realizing the TAO concept.
A. CTAS MODEL
1. Concept
It is envisioned that CTAS would combine all Tactical Action Officer decision
aids into one interrelated system. Its core would be expert systems and signal
processors based upon neural network technology. It is believed that such a structure
would achieve the characteristics necessary to provide real-time expert assistance to all
parts of the tactical decision making process.
CTAS is an expansion of the NTDS and AEGIS Combat System concepts. It
is the next step in the continuum of providing computerized support to tactical
decision makers at sea. Key to the system is employing direct sensor input to neural
net signal processors which in turn would provide input data to neural network
knowledge processing modules or conventional expert systems. A computer system
such as this could aid the TAO in all facets and phases of mission execution and ship
defense.
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What follows is a hierarchical presentation of relevant attributes which the
author feels are important in constructing such a system. The letters next to each node
indicate the relative importance of that capability (A-Important, B- Useful, C-
Desireable). Several levels of decomposition are presented in Figures 5.1 through 5.11.
Three vertical dots with an arrow beneath a module indicate that the structure of that
module is the same as that to which the arrow is pointing. A greater level of
decomposition precision than that shown will be required before actual design but the
figures give a possible system breakdown.
2. Explanation of Structure
The CTAS breakdown presented is based on the author's perception of system
requirements as a result of his experience in computers, his knowledge of ship systems,
and his experience as a TAO. Other structures are certainly possible and may even be
more appropriate. This is but a baseline from which to commence discussion.
TAO school teaches Tactical Action Officers to think of defensive problems in
terms of the specific threat and the best counter to that threat. Consequently, the given
CTAS functional decomposition mainly uses the below listed hierarchy.
• Forces (Friendly, Enemy, Third Party)
• Major Equipment Systems
• Warfare Areas
• Medium of Signal Transmission
• Method of Signal Transmission
The three main sub-modules shown in Figure 5. 1 are derived from the groups
of TAO aids defined in Chapter I and the curriculum areas taught at TAO school.
They follow the author's perception of the TAO's approach to defensive tactical
problems. Moduie 1 is a repository of knowledge from which ail decisions are based,
module 2 is for identifying and assessing threats to the ship and module 3 determines
actions to defend the ship via threat destruction or neutralization. Although this paper
espouses further research into tactical uses for neural networks, a completely neural
system may not be feasible nor desireable. Therefore, this structure may facilitate easier
implementation of a hybrid system utilizing both conventional and neural computer
architectures. Full names for all modules can be found in Table 2 on page 31.
a. Module 1 - Repository of Information
The information module is an advanced idea of the 'paperless ship'
espoused by VADM Metcalf [Ref. 17]. It is an on-line library of tactical information
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containing knowledge of friendly and enemy weapon system capabilities, limitations,
procedures, tactics and characteristics (essentially, the information summarized on page
10). From this readily available source of knowledge, the TAO will be able to
understand the threat and plan effective actions against it.
All information must be in a form usable by CTAS either by database call-
up or preferably by incorporation into the system's knowledge processing functions.
There must also be a version available for use directly by the TAO.
The repository of information module is divided by period of storage (i.e.
Long Term or Short Term). That is to say, whether it is expected that the information
will be required indefinitely or for less than a few days. This is done because it may
have a bearing on the methods of storage and access.
(1) Module 1.1 - Long Term Information. This is data with an indefinite
shelf life. It contains background information required for effective decision making.
(2) Module I.I.I - Warfare Publication Library, information contained in
Naval Warfare Publications, intelligence documents and unit commander general
operational planning directives (OPGENS). It is initially divided by friendly, enemy and
third party forces, and planning instructions from higher authority. These modules are
further decomposed by warfare areas which in turn are divided by major functional or
information groups as may be appropriate.
(3) Module 1.1.2 - Signal Library. This module contains information
concerning electromagnetic, acoustic and electro-optical signals which may be found in
a maritime environment. The existence of this data in neural form within this module
will depend on whether the signal representations are better maintained in separate
modules or incorporated within the netware of the sensor signal processors. As a
minimum this module will contain the data in a form usable by the TAO.
Further decomposition of this module is by force grouping, the
medium through which the signal travels and method of signal transmission.
(4) Module 1.1.3 - Own-Ship Specific Information. This is information
peculiar to the particular ship in which the CTAS resides. Data such as turning
diameter, acceleration tables, equipment deficiencies, active sensor radiation patterns,
quietest engineering configuration and most economical speed. It is decomposed in
terms of ship systems and subsystems. Further decomposition is determined by the
specifics of the system concerned. Figure 5.6 shows one possible configuration.
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(5) Module 1.2 - Short Term Information. This module contains
information with a finite shelf life. Except for purposes of engagement reconstruction
the utility of data contained here would normally be measured in minutes, hours or
days. It is the same information which would normally be displayed for the TAO on
status boards in CIC. This information is basically a summary of sensor data,
equipment/system status, navigational position and other information which may be
used in the immediate decision process. Decomposition below the major system level is
dependent upon the specifics of that major system.
b. Module 2 - Threat Identification and Assessment
This node is essentially an expert system which looks at sensor data and
information contained in module 1 to identify and assess the threat to the ship.
Instrumental to this plan are neural net signal processors which would glean desired
signals from environmental noise. They may also be able to identify or classify these
signals by weapon, type of ship or perhaps even down to the hull number of the
emanating platform. These signals would then be considered as inputs to the
knowledge processing portion of the module to aid in contact identification and
assessment as to threat. The knowledge processing capabilities of neural networks may
prove useful here.
c. Module 3 - Threat Destruction!Neutralization
This module is a knowledge processing system which looks at the assessed
threat and other information to recommend ship actions to counter it. It is
decomposed by major functions.
(1) Module 3.1 • Target Selection. This component would be a knowledge
processing system to determine the most imminent threat to the ship. It would make
such a determination by taking into account current target actions and recent history
of enemy tactics. It would require direct inputs from module 2 and incorporate the
knowledge contained in module 1.
(2) Module 3.2 - Weapon Selection. This component would select the best
weapon to counter the threat and feed firing parameters directly to the weapon system.
(3) Module 3.3 - Ship Control Functions. This component of the
knowledge processing system would recommend ship control actions to optimize target
prosecution. Items such as recommending the best aspect to minimize own-ship radar
signature and most appropriate engineering configuration to maintain necessary
systems yet give maximum reserve capacities.
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(4) Module 3.4 - Sensor Operation. This component would recommend
the most appropriate ECCM parameters to enter to ensure sensor operation given
possible and actual enemy countermeasures.
B. WHY USE NEURAL NETWORKS
1. Existing Technology
Someone who is familiar with current computer technology could make a case
for implementing CTAS completely with existing expert system and database
capabilities, thus avoiding the risks involved in employing a new and untested field.
The author acknowledges that indeed many, if not all. of the modules proposed in
CTAS could be constructed with proven conventional computer technology. However,
the characteristics of neural networks indicate that they have the potential to vastly
improve present capabilities in tactical uses of computers.
2. Maintaining the Tactical Picture
It is generally known among surface warriors that maintaining an accurate
tactical picture at sea usmg computers is very difficult because it changes rapidly and
deals with imperfect knowledge. It can also be added that current technologies require
significant manual intervention to circumvent these problems. The intrinsic
characteristics of neural nets to rapidly assess information and deal with incomplete,
erroneous or incorrect inputs augur well toward solving these issues.
3. Signal Processing and Interpretation
Sensor processing is basically a two part problem: transforming patterns to a
useful form and recognizing patterns once they are in that usable form. Neural nets are
adept at such functions and can deal with both spatial patterns (i.e. fixed power
spectra, fixed images, ship silhouettes, written words) and spatiotemporal patterns (i.e.
dynamic video, continuous speech, sonar, radar, doppler audio). The
Grossberg/Mingolla Vision Processing Network and the Fukushima Neocognition
model have already demonstrated the ability to handle these tasks. [Ref. 15: p. 3]
The ability of. neural nets to instantaneously match patterns and distill
information from seemingly unrelated masses of data, make them ideal candidates for
passive sonar systems, electro-optical sensors and anti-jam circuits.
4. Data Storage and Retrieval
Dr. James A. Anderson, from the Department of Physiology at UCLA,
suggests a memory storage model which could have neural network applications
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[Ref. 18: p. 113]. Such a model, combined with the ability of neural nets to rapidly
search and correlate information, could provide a suitable architecture for knowledge
processing CTAS modules that may allow them to function within the time constraints
of a tactical engagement.
5. Threat Assessment
In dealing with threats at sea, information is often missing, may be
contradictory or even wrong. Conventional expert systems do not function well in such
an environment, yet. neural networks do very well. The Anderson Knowledge
Processing Neural Network, the Kosko Fuzzy Cognitive Map and the Carpenter-
Grossberg Adaptive Resonance Network have already demonstrated that capability.
6. Summary
Neural networks may not be a panacea to solve all the problems concerning
computer decision related assistance to the tactical decision maker but they do portend
well. CTAS, built with neural network technology, has the potential to provide the
TAO with real-time, multi-level decision assistance. The author suggests further study
is merited.
C. DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
Several topics must be addressed in constructing computerized decision assistance
systems for the TAO. Zivovic and Gostlow mentioned several of these concerns in the
presentations of their TAO expert system prototypes. Other questions include: 1) What
kind of trade-offs should be made between decision support system speed versus
reliability? 2) What system configuration is sufficiently robust in terms of both its
ability to operate with incomplete data and its ability to sustain battle damage? 3)
What form should the man-machine interface take considering the high stress
environment in which it will be used? 4) What neural net models are appropriate for
what function(s)? and 5) How can classified data be made quickly accessible and stiil
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Figure 5.1 CTAS Level 0.
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Figure 5.2 CTAS Level 1.
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Figure 5.3 CTAS Level 1.1,
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Figure 5.4 CTAS Level 1.1.1.
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Figure 5.5 CTAS Level 1.1.2.
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Figure 5.6 CTAS Level 1.1.3.
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Figure 5.7 CTAS Level 1.2.
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Figure 5.8 CTAS Levels 1.2.1 through 1.2.4.
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Figure 5.9 CTAS Levels 1.2.5 through 1.2.8.
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Figure 5.10 CTAS Level 2.
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Figure 5.11 CTAS Level 3.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. TAO DECISION FUNCTIONS ARE COMPLEX
The position of Tactical Action Officer was initially created to provide quick
reaction defense of Naval vessels until the Commanding Officer could arrive in CIC
and assume the duties of fighting the ship. Since that time, the TAO's duties have
evolved to managing whatever aspects of the tactical employment of his ship that the
CO deems appropriate. In doing so, he must plan operations, identify and assess
threats, and determine how best to continue an engagement once it commences.
The problems encountered in executing those TAO functions are many, varied
and difficult. For example, the domain in which the Tactical Action Officer must
function contains a wide range of stimuli to which he must respond. The body of
possible responses to those stimuli is also immense even when constrained by rules of
engagement which may be imposed. In assessing his options, the Tactical Action
Officer must be familiar with a vast amount of knowledge and he also must be able to
understand ill- structured problems.
The speed and sophistication of modern weapons decreases the time available for
the TAO to assess data, recall information, reach decisions, and act upon those
decisions. An anti-ship cruise missile traveling at Mach 1.8 covers 18 nautical miles in
approximately 1 minute. In the time between launch and impact, an incoming missile
must be detected, assessed as a threat, a countering weapon must be assigned, firing
parameters must be entered, and the defensive weapon launched in order to intercept
it. During the period before missile launch, the TAO must receive and interpret orders
from higher authority, the status of ship systems, sensor indications and other data in
determining his most appropriate course of action. In doing all this, questions of
information overload and accuracy come into piay.
Even with all these problems, the Tactical Action Officer is required to make
correct and timely decisions in defending his ship and carrying out her mission.
Computerized systems could resolve many of the problems addressed. Current
computer technology is capable of solving several of these issues but is not capable of
eliminating them all.
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B. CURRENT TECHNOLOGY CANNOT ADDRESS ALL PROBLEMS
There currently exist systems in the fleet which are capable of assisting in the
quick reaction defense of ships. Yet the author knows of no operational knowledge
processing systems that can assist the TAO's decision process in tactically viable real-
time.
Expert systems and database technology show some of the traits necessary to
build a system such as CTAS which could address some of the issues raised in this
paper. Yet, even though such systems may be able to provide decision assistance to the
TAO, they still tend to be too slow for tactical applications. Expert systems can
intelligently process knowledge but they require specific inputs which must be applied
against a fixed set of rules. They have difficulty handling fuzzy or incomplete inputs or
concepts.
Conventional computers are subject to catastrophic failure. Damage or
degradation of one part of the computer may render the entire machine inoperable.
Because of the probability of sustaining battle damage during an engagement, such an
occurance could have significant impact on maintaining the combat capabilities of a
ship.
Current technology also requires manual programming to update systems. This
has the potential to result in long 'down' times to effect changes.
Even though current computer systems possess several characteristics required to
effectively aid the tactical decision process, they fall short in many respects.
C. NEURAL NETWORKS HOLD PROMISE
Although still in their infancy, neural networks possess many characteristics
which could be useful in building a computerized system to combine decision aids for
the TAO into one entity and assist him in tactically acceptable real-time. Neural nets
show strengths which could be useful in signal processors, threat detection systems,
and knowledge processing.
The ability of neural nets to recognize' patterns has direct application in acoustic.
electromagnetic, and electro-optical signal processing [Ref. 15: p. 3]. They possess the
ability to extract knowledge from seemingly unrelated masses of data which could
provide significant benefit in the ability to receive signals through enemy
countermeasures. Pattern recognition also gives neural nets unique knowledge
processing capabilities in that they can achieve instantaneous nearest neighbor
classification. They can function with fuzzy or incomplete inputs and have shown the
47
ability to handle ill-structured problems. They also have the ability to recognize
continuous speech and associative recall allows them to obtain the correct input data
with incomplete or incorrect inputs. [Refs. 6,13: pp. 25.4]
Robustness is a significant plus concerning neural net systems. Nets have been
observed to function with no decrease in effectiveness with up to 15% of neurons
inoperable. As the number of inoperable neurons increases, the functions gradually
degrade as opposed to catastrophic failure which occurs in conventional computers.
[Ref. 6: p. 24]
Several neural net models also have the ability to learn or program themselves as
they operate. Such an ability could allow systems to get smarter the more they are
used. [Ref. 13: p. 4] Further, hybrids of existing models may even exhibit benefits not
already observed.
The current state of neural network, development does not suggest near term
fruition of CTAS as envisioned, but development of sensor processors appears to be
within the realm of imminent possibilities. Explonng the potential of neural nets couid
significantly aid in maintaining our assumed edge in tactical weapon systems. The
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